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The Daper  d e s c r i b e s  a pre l iminarv  s t a p e  of ~uthor'n innuGryv 
\\ Aimed a t  in- tegxat ing t h e  'Lposs ib le  wo-ld. approa-.h with the  
i d e a  o f  t r e a t i n g  umerances  a s  orog-ams. I t  i s  cl:?imed t h a t  
p r o v i d i n g  ~1 onhis t ica ted  f a c i  l i t i e n  fcr- mani p u l a t i n g  poss ib le  
world' '  d e sc r i n t i ons  should be one of t h e  main concerns i n  
designing a n a t u r a l  language understanding system. The l o g i c a l  
\\ & 
notion o f  possible world" has  a c l o s e  counte-rpa~t  i n  the 
computer sc ience  nn t ion  o f  t he  environment o f  expression 
eva lua t ion .  The i?.ea of treating  utterance^ a s  programs 1s 
genera l ized  bv al lowing enui*onmt! h t  s~aritohing dur ing tha  eval-  
ua t i on  of an  u t te rance .  A model o f  natural language, based on 
m u l t i p l e  envi-ronments i n  the  sense jus t  mentioned, i s  out l ined 
i n  terms o f  computer science. A rough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  envi- 
ronment tyoes  i s  given. One si t ructure of environments i n  d e w  
voted  t o  keepine t rack o f  the  d i r e c t  and ind i - rec t  speech re -  
curs ive  quotat ions.  Another structurG i s  asshgned t o  every 
pe r son  involved i n  a discourse  o r  mentioned i n  it; i t  i s  used 
t o  handle be l ie f - sen tences ,  l i e s  and promises. A third type o f  
environment i s  used t o  r ep r e sen t  the s t r u c t u r e  o f  t op i c s  i n  a 
d iscourse .  Advantages o f  the  advocated approach ,  ca l l ed  the  
rnul t inle  environment model o f  n a t u r a l  language\' a r e  denon- 
s t r a t ed  i n  the  d i scuss ion  o f  well-known problems o f  ~ f - r e n c e  
ana presupposi-tions. 
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6, R e f e r e n ~ e s  
The paper p resen ts  neveral  i dea s  cn how Do d e s c r i b e  n a t u r a l  lan-  
p a g e s  f o r  a  language understanding system. Some o f  them a r e  
similar t o  those advocated by Zlakoff (1968) and Mor~an (1969). 
They have been derived by t he  author independently ( ~ i e n  1975) 
while exp1ori .n~ t he  D ~ v i e s  and Is~rd ( 1  972) ~ P D T O ~ C ~  of  t r e a t i n g  
u t t e r ances  as programs. 
The subjec t  examined i n  the  paper i s  i t s e l f  broad and encom- 
passes  many con t rov~rs i e s ;however ,  i t  i s  no t  the  author  s i n t e n t  
t o  make a case f o r  the  ideas  presented.  f i r s t l y ,  t he  l i m i t s  of 
t he  p a p e r  do no t  permit a proper d i scuss ion  of  t he  p r o s  and cons 
f o r  each so lu t i on  proposed; and furthermore mos t  o f  these  prob-  
lems have a t n a d i t i o n  da t ing  a s  f a r  back a s  the Itfiddle Ages, 
i n  some cases.  And wxondly,  t h e  author has not  ye t  developed 
h l l  o f  h i s  own concepts f u l l y  enough t o  warrent a de ta i l ed  
presen ta t ion .  I n s t ead , t he  paner seeks  t o  present  the  s impl i c i ty  
and gene ra l i t y  o f  t h e  proposed approach 
The w n e r  i s  an enlarged and modified- vers ion of a talk 
de l ive red  a t  the  Fourth I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Jo in t  Conference on 
A r t i f i c i a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  i n  T b i l i s i .  The modif icat ions envolve 
mainly t he  terminology and the  form of p resen ta t ion ;  the  only 
e s s e n t i a l  change of some importance i s  the  d i f f e r e n t  treatment 
o f  the  first and second person pronouns. 
Most of t he  examples i n  the  paper a r e  d i r e c t  quotat ions f r o m  
the referenced literature; herein, some are employed somewhat 
differently than was their original intent. 
2. Discourses a_ proarams. 
2.1. Utterances an anoarams, 
1% is now obvious that the human ability to use language i o  re- 
lated Closely to intelligence itseif.Nevertheles3,the complexitv 
of hatural language is still rather underestimated by linguists, 
which results usually in using relafively primitive tools for a 
formal description of language. Although such f o r m a l i n m s  like 
e. 6 .  transformation&l grammar may be theoretically adequate,  
from a practical point of view they are too cumbersome ; (i n my 
opinion writing a transformational grammar may be only compared 
with programming a sophisticated system exclusively in an as- 
sembly language). The main merit of krtificial Intelligence for 
the development of computational linguistics lies in suggesting 
a quite new way of thinking about language. It consists in 
shifting the at tention cTf re search from linguistic competence 
to linguistic perfomance and zreating the latter as an opera- 
tion of a real or imagined language ppocessor, which m turn 
can be discussed in terms of computer science.':'inoarad (1 972: 2) 
claims even that the  best test of  a complex model of natural 
language is to implement it as language understanding system. 
Although he i s  basically correct, in the present state of 
a r t ,  t he  ob jec t ion  posed by Charnialc i s  o f t e n  vsl-iu. ke lmiak  
( 1 ~ [ 2 : 2 )  not iced t h a t  mos t  programs i n  A r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i gence  
handle on ly  a few kindu" oT s e l ec t ed  t e s t  exampleo. D e c i d i n ~  
t h a t  a program can be extended i n  nome e a s i l y  imaginable way t o  
handle more extunple:: o r  more sophis t ica ted  cases  regtxires p rac -  
t i c n l l y  the  same procedure a s  verifying a non-programed theory. 
Therefore, I t r e a t  ~ i n o g r a d ' s  pos tu la t e  an a long-krm aim, and 
a t  this moment Z advocate a l e s s  ambitious s t r a t egy :  t o  use a s  
much poss ib le  o f  the computer science i n t u i t i o n s  i n  ??a t u 2 a l  
Language desc r ip t ion .  This i s  i n  f a c t  a l s o  t h e  approach o f  
Longuet-Higgins (1972) ~vho s t a t e s  t h a t  n a t u r a l  l a n g ~ a g e  u t -  
t erances a r e  jus t  programs t o  be run  i n  sur brains. 
Some i n t e r e s t i n g  analogies between lahguage ~mderstsnding and 
rumsing a POP-2 program have been shown e. g. i n  (3avies ,  
Inard 1972) .  I pursue t h i s  approach i n  another  d i r ec t i on ,  
charocter ised  by an in tens ive  use o f  the no t ion  of  environment, 
I n  the  e a r l i e r  s tage  o f  the  inqu i ry ,  represented by (Bien 1 9 7 5 ) ~  
I thought t h a t  a l l  the  environment manipulations which were 
necessary f o r  t he  feasibility o f  my ap-proach c o u l d  be r e a l i ~ e d  
bg rteans o f  t he  Bobrovi and 3egbrei t  r n l ~ l t i p l  envirollments 
primiSives ( 1  972) ; theref  o r e ,  I have introduced the  term 
t i  
~ ~ u l t i p l e  environments n o d d  o f  n a t u r a l  language , Now I am not  
sure o f  i t ,  because I see reasons t o  use e. g, cross-world 
bindings , whose r e l a t i o n  t o  t he  Bobrow-Vegbreit p r imi t ives  i s  
not y e t  c l e a r  t o  m e .  Anyway, I s t i l l  use the  term mul t ip le  en- 
vironments model of natural languages because i t  charac t e r i s e s  
w e l l  my approach  even if it is to be understood only metaphos-  
i ca l ly .  
It should be noted that  cons ide r ing  a l l  u t t e r ances  as a kind of 
imperative is not a new idea  f o r  l inguis ts ;  i t  can be found 
9. 4. in (Wierzbicka 1969) ,  but t o  my knowledge such l o  eas had 
no practical impact on  linguistic re searcn. 
2.2. The n o t i o n  or alscourse. 
The notion o f  d i ~ l c o u r s e  (called a l s o  coherent t e x t )  is a 
r a t h e r  vague one. I w i l l  try t o  c l a r i f y  my use of  the term 
by discussing s e  veraJ. aspects of coherency. 
k ' i r s t ,  t he re  is a type of coherency wh ich  1 shall ca l l  textual. 
It is r e a l i m d  by these  inter-sentence and inter-ph~ase lihks 
which are  visible i n  the t e x t  surface as some lexical i tems o r  
syntactical fea tmes .  Surface r e a l i s a t i o n s  of t hese  links I 
shall call po in te r s .  A s i m p l e  but very i m p o r t a n t  class of 
pointers c o n s i s t s  o f  Eronouns understood i n  a broad sense, 
inc luding  pro-adverbs e t  c. There a r e  a l s o  pointers peculiar t o  
given languages; e. g. a f t e r  McCawley ( 1 9 7 1 )  and I a a r d  (1974) 
i t  is reasonable for English to t r e a t  t h e  P a s t  tense  as a 
pointer, because ( i sa rd  1974) i t  acts as a form of d e f i n i t e  
re ference  to a past situation on which t h e  a t t e n t i o n  of the 
conversants has r e cen t l y  be= focussed The presu~pos t t ions -  
of ten  function ~ i m i l e r l y  t o  p o i n t e r s ,  but I think t ha t  presup- 
positions a r e  essentially d i f f e r e n t  from  pointer^ and I p r e f e r  
t o  account for them i n  another m y ,  
A second type of coherency I shall c a l l  s . i t u e t i o ~ . a l ,  The s i t u -  
ation o f  a conversation can influence the  coherence of the 
message in two ways. First, it can supply values for these  
po in te r s  which are not assigned by the t e x t  i t s e l f .  It i s  the 
case of e. g. [Isard 1974a) 
( 1 )  Be c a r e f u l ,  he might b i t e  you. 
s a i d  while t he  adressee  i s  near a dangerous eninal. Such an 
u t t e r ance  can be easily transformed i n t o  a t ex tua l ly  coherent 
one by in t roduc ing  a na r ra to r .  The second type of s i t u a t i o n a l  
coherency i s  more sub t l e  , i t  c o n s i s t s  of applying the  addresse ' s 
knowledge t o  fill up some r e l a t i o n s  mi  t t e d  in the sender s 
message, This i s  needed e. g. i n  the t e x t  ( B e l l e r t  1972:79) 
( 2 )  ~nn's e l d e s t  son has l e f t  Warsaw f o r  a s cho la r sh ip  study 
in the Sorbonne, 
( 3 )  France is an interesting c o - m t r ~  to study in. 
where the  knowledge that t he  Sorbonne is a French un ive r s r ty  
has t o  supply t h e  missing link. I n  genera l ,  a text  is s i t ua -  
tionally coherent only relative to a given domain of  knowledge. 
I n  practice we of ten  communicate our i d e a s  by means of 
non-coherent texts; the communication succeeds only beceuse 
the addressee modifies his b e l i e f s  for t h e  purpose of making 
t he  t e x t  coherent r e l a t i v e  to t h i s  updated domain of h i s  
a e ~ i e f ~ ,  Because he  does i t  only i f  he decides more o r  l e s s  
a r b i t r a r i l y ,  tha t  t h e  message has a meaning, such t e x t s  I shall 
c a l l  v o l i - b i o n a r i l . ~  coherent,. h t y p i c a l  example i s  a t e x t  witl .~ 
3 sentence which c a r r i e . ~  brand n e w  information by means of 
presupposit ions.  The existence o f  such sentences ha s been 
p o i n t e d  out by Wierzbicka (1969) ,  B e l l e r t  ( 1972:79), r e c e n t l y  
by Karttunen (1974:191) who gave the f o l l o w i n g  examples: 
( 4 )  1 would! like t o  in t roduce  you t o  my wife. 
) We r e g r e t  that  c h i l d r e n  cannot accompany t h e i r  p a r e n t s  
t o  commencment exerc ises ,  
where ( 4 )  presupposes the  existence of the  wife and ( 5 )  
tha t  its complement is tme but b o t h  sentences are used 
in situations which do not  s a t i s f y  these  p~ esupposit ions.  
T o r  the sake of completeness i t  i s  necessa ry  t o  mention t he  
situations, Where the text  conta in  po in t e r s  without values, but 
they a r e  considered by the  addressee as not relevant to the 
matter at hand. This s i t u a t i o n  seems t o  happen only i n  l i t e r a r y  
tex ta .  
2*3.  Discourse  processing, 
I w i l l  discuss below t he  main levels o f  d i scourse  ana lys i s .  
I ignoie  discourse  generation for two reasons.  F i r s t  i s  a 
theoretical one: I Pee l  strongly that i t  i s  the  analysis which 
bs the  primary a c t i v i t y  and that t h e  generat ion is dr iven  by 
t he  eva lua t ion  of the  r e -ana lys i s  o f  a generated t e x t .  Second 
reason i s  a p r a c t i c a l  one: a t  t h e  present  s t a t e  of a r t  we have 
much b e t t e r  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  p rocessen  than i n t o  t h e  
syn thes i s  problems. 
According t o  t h e  present  views I t a k e  f o r  g r a n t e d  t h a t  t h e  
analysis c o n s i s t s  o f  a s e t  of coopera t ing  p roces se s  performing 
d i f f e r e n t  task, i n  p a ~ t i c u l a r  the  s y n t a c t i c ,  semantic and 
pragmatic analys is ,  By a - l e v e l  mentioned above I mean a se c U.L 
such processes  which manipult i te t h e  not ions  of  s i m i l a r  type ,  i n  
t h e  intuitive sense o f  t h e  same degree of  abotractness r e l a t i v e  
t o  t he  physical message. 
I dis t inguish f o u r  l e v e l s .  
The l e v e l  respons ib le  for e x t r a c t i n g  r e l evan t  information from 
acous t i c  signal o r  a visual image I c a l l  t h e  s o r b t i o n .  I men- 
t i o n  i t  here only f o r  t h e  sake of completeness as I have no- 
thing t o  say on t h i s  sub jec t .  
The second I ,  1 1  t::e only rsint  uf interect of the 
present  paper ,  I c a l l  the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  I mean hy i t  the  
p roces s  t ak ing  as  data the  r e s u l t s  of so rb t ion  ( o f  course ,  i t  
does no t  mean that  the sorbt ion is t o  be executed before the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ;  the  s o r b t i o n  should supp ly  p a r t i a l  r e s u l t s  on 
the reques t  o f  t he  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n )  and yielding some value in 
t h e  formal i sm used i n  the  system under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  the 
representa t ion  o f  knowledge. F o r  simplicity 1 assume here  t h a t  
the  knowledge i s  represented i n  labelled graphs s tored  i n  a 
c l a s s i c a l  way i n  a 1PLRNluER-like associative data base 
( H e w i t  197 1 ) ,  e.g. t h e  va lue  o f  t h e  sentence (Charniak 1972:83) 
( 6 )  D i l l  g o t  the ba l l  be fore  he went t o  the  park.  
m a y  be something l i k e  
( 7 )  ( N l  BEPORE DT2 N 3 )  
( N Z  GET l jILLl BILL3)  
(lu3 GO aZLLl pARK1 ) 
It i s  of ten  assumed that  t e x t  processing by a language under- 
s t a n d i n g  sys tem c o n s i s t s  only o f  t h o s e  two l e v e l s  o r  t h e i r  
gquiva lence .  I i n s i s t  on the  n e c e s s i t y  of two a d d i t i o n a l  l e v e l s .  
Y i r s t  of them I c a l l  ,iud,gement.Thi; i z  t h e  lctvel  1.2 ,]Q:-. Tale Lo: 
keeping  the  b e l i e f s  of the  aystem consis tent .  A s  long  as  t r i v -  
ial wor lds  a r e  considered,  t h i s  l e v e l  can be i n t eg ra t ed  i n t o  
some systematically performed uata  base  bookkeeping \'hen we 
s t a r t  t o  model more compl ica ted  worlds ,  we w i l l  f a c e  the  prob- 
lem o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  ur p r a c t i c a l  u n d e c i d a b i l i t y  of bookkeeping 
problems and therefore t h i s  l e v e l  i s  t o  be thoroughly con t ro l -  
l e d  by the system s u p e r v i s o r .  Such a solution agrees  1~Lth the  
t 1 I n t u t i o n  o f  Marciszewski ( 1972: 180) t h a t  u m s t  b e l i e f s  a r e  
spontaneous and that it is the en t e r t a in ing  of a b e l i e f  with 
the awareness o f  non-accept ing that r e q u i r e s  a s p e c i a l  a c t  of  
giving up; the suspension of judgement i s  t h e r e f o r e  an a c t  more 
sophisticated than spontaneous a e l i e f  'I 
The f o u r t h  l a v e l ,  which I c a l l  the i n t e r n a t i o n ,  should be de- 
signed t o  memorize t h e  f a c t s  marked by t h e  jutigernent l e v e l  as 
i m p o r t a n t  enough t o  be   to red. A s  f a r  aa 1 knolv, t h e  i n v e s t i -  
gation o f  t h e  p r o b l e d s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  l e v e l  has been neg lec ted ,  
the only exceptions being t h e  works of Chafe, in p a r t i c u l a r  
(Chafe 1973).  
A l l  t he  r e c e n t  works on speech u n d e r s t a n d i n r ;  a s  wel l  a s  on 
d i s c o w s e  analysis show t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  a s  
a r u l e  ambiguous. F o r  particular domains of d i s c o u r s e  we of t en  
f i n d  some p a r t i c u l a r  r u l e s  t o  d i sambigua te  sentences ,  but  t h e  
f i n d  s o l u t i o n  c o n s i s t s ,  i n  my o p i n i o n ,  i n  f o r m a l i z i n g  and 
i m p l e m e n t i n g  general  pragmatic rules, which I s h a l l  s k e t c n  
b e L OII~. 
The h i g h e s t  p r i o r i t y  r u l e  s h o u l d  be the rule-  of  c-ohe_rencs, i t  
says t h a t  this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  a discourse i s  b e t t e r  wi:ieh 
y i e l d s  a s  the  v a l u e  the more dense graph.The d e n s i t y  of a graph 
can be computed as e. g. the  r a t i o  of graph a r r o w s  t o  t h e  number 
o f  n o d e s ;  i f  our graprls a r e  frame s t r u c t u r e s  i n  tr.e sense of 
Vinograd ( 1  974), we can compute t h e  r a t i o  of t h e  m p o r t a n t  e l -  
ements filled up t o  the  i m p o r t a n t  element slots left unas- 
signed. I f e e l  i t  i s  j u s t  t h e  r u l e  which chocses p r o p e r l y  the  
r e f e r e n t  o f  t h e  last sentence "she" in the examples (Cha rn i ak  
1972:56):  
(8 )  Penny wanted t o  go t o  %ill's par ty .  
~vlother had t o  C e l l  h e r  t h a t  she had no t  been invlted. 
( 9 )  When Penny heard about the custume b a l l  $he s t a r t e d  
thinking about  what Mother could  weas. 
Idother had t o  tell h e r  t h a t  she hhd n o t  been i n v i  bed. 
In general ,  t he  net e f f e c t  o f  t h e  col~erence rule vc i . 11  be t h n t  
son-eticles the re Cerents of d i f f e r e n t  nolzn l'.x3;hr:e.* (or'a in gen- 
~ a l ,  the lint,wCCal;ic *leans which I c e l l  de s ignd to so )  a r c  cox- 
l apsed  t o  foxa one object  T o r  tht :  sake of the h igher  dexlsi-ty of 
the  result. Therefore t h e  rule ~ i s i l  a l s o  h e l p  r t o  i ln l~dlc  
p ,~e3txpponi t ions  p r o p e r l y ,  ;le may t r e a t  every prcc :uppoas t ion  as 
carrying brand nec. infor 'nation and leave  f o r  the  coherenay 
rule the  task o f  co l l aps ing  eventual ly  the  presupposed f a c t s  
with the  facts already known by the system. 
Second rum I c a l l  the consistency_ rule. I mean by it t h e  
simple but important r u l e  : if one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  an ut terance 
i a  inconsistent , l o o k  f o r  another interpret a t i o n ,  It explains 
why for the utterance (Russel 1905) : 
(10) I thought your yacht was l a rge r  than i t  is. 
one should not redc t  by saying 
(11) N o ,  my yacht is n o t  l a r g e r  thm id; is; 
or why we treat the  sentence (McCawley ? y 6 7 ) :  
{ l r )  B o r i s  s a i d  that he didn' t  luss the giri who he Ussed. 
a8 the  inf orma-tion thdt B o r i s  l i e d  ari'd no t  tha t  he ut-teped a 
non-consisted utterance , 
The t 3 i r d  and moat  s u b t l e  rule v ~ i ~ i c ! ~  ]sac the lo\*;: t p r i m l t -  
\ C ?  i T f  1' V t T ,  T: c a l l  t h e  eft'icislwy r u l c .  . YCL:; 1: f i c n  J t,. 
kduine, can be found in A:dukiewicc ( )  f i l i s  i v l ~  '-tnSc;7 
$ha t  if we kave t o  choose between t w c  i n t e r p r c t n t i o r . .  cf R :eW*=- 
- > ;  t e c c e ,  \:F c ' l : z ~ ~ e  the c ther  i n t e r p r e t a t L o : ~ ,  5.- 3:?b L U  
on t h e  a ~ r u n l p t i o n  thst tbic sv,..rlder wa: a~:.\rose a '  413, :-;~U~QIV-I:.,~ 
p os::F1~i: i t i c 3  und zcns i ,~ur ly  uzed t!:e r:slmt: 2 :;::-:icr? k tt.3 sar,:.~.:i~*~: 
J 7 \ -  t c trnnsmi t the n e w a g e  es;lz*cc: L':le : ;  -2p ":iL: 5ezAt c--q% eL -- & - 
B 
- 
on the  b e a o  of 1 ; h ~  ~ f f j  ~5 ~ > X I C Y  1 u l e  p r e f  ~ . r  i n t e r p z . e - $ r > -  
t i o n  of  ( I j) w i ~ i c i ~  s equiva len t  i o 
m w  --.I ( 15 )  Caesar knew t n a t  -3orne l i e s  on P ~ ; S e r  m d  t h a t  - . m e  
is t h e  c a p i t a l  o f  the Fopes .  
Incidentally, in sore ,ci t71ations the ef f iciencv V r c l - e  m y  suggest 
f o r  the sentences s i m i l a l  t o  ( I ? )  zn i n t e r ~ r . e t a t i c n  + a n a l o g i c a l  
to (14). Let us assume for exsmpld t h e t  Stan ley  is so1viz.g 2 
cros:q:vord puzz le  and rlas t o  f i l l  in a pattern spec;-Ee.3 5.: 
KI - \I 
.'+fir c l u e  the  r i v e r  on vii?ich lies the c a p i t a l  o l  the L c e s  ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . . . I b y  
knov;s tk~t Eone i s  the c a p i t a l  of r 3 i ) ~  I J $ *  $QPE.  x c t  
know t ha t  Rome lies on the  T i b e r .  IIe may ask John about the  
name o f  the  river and receive the p r o p e r  answer. IIow, r:hen 
Ftanley is asked by somebody 
(1  6) Have you properly f i l l e d  in t h i s  pa t t e rn?  
t h e r e  is a q u i t e  natural  answer 
(17) Yes, John said t h a t  t h e  c a p i t a l  o f  t he  Popes l i e s  
on -the T i b e r  
To s w a r i z e , I  think the  only so lu t i on  t o  t he  ambiguity problem 
is the breadth  first search in the  sense o f  Charniak (1Y72:75) 
with the  above-mentioned r u l e s  used t o  evaluate the i n t e r -  
p re td t ions .  It does not mean t h a t  I neg lec t  t h e  need f o ~  tl:e 
ru les  p e c u l i a r  for par t i cu la r  discourse domsino, They a r e  nec- 
essary for e f f i c i ency  o f  t he  interpretation p r o c e s s  and they 
should dr ive  the  search,but they  may not be allowed t o  o v e r r i d e  
any in t e rp re t a t ion ,  as is the  case in t h e  ';!ilks preference 
grammar. F o r  the  sentence (Wilks 1974:32) 
(18) The hunter licised his gun a l l  over ,  and the  s t o c k  
tasted e ape c i a l l y  good, 
the  r e a l  w o r l d  knowledge would probably cause the interpreta- 
t i o n  with the "soup" sense o f  s t o c k  t o  be found first,but t h e  
coherency r u l e  w o u l d  p r o p e r l y  choose t h e  interpretation where 
"stock'\ is understood as a par t  o f  the gun. 
Mul t ip l e  environments.  
4 2 1 , The n o t i o n  o f  envirolment , 
Tn nctuL3l  1:mgunge understanding :~y:;temo the  ftjc ts st ol*cd i n  
t he  zystem memory are c l a s s i f i e d  accordin(: t o  their ontolog~cal 
s t a t u s  i n  R very  r o u g h  way. Usually they are split into the 
c l a s s e s :  past versus p r c s c n t  nnd r e a l i t y -  v e r s u s  po ssible 
f u t u r e  ; t h e  only exceptions are the system for playing tic- 
t ac - toe  of Isard ( 1  974), Sosiii and 'Jeischedel ( 1973). In t h e  
l i n g u i s t i c  l i t e r a t u r e  one can e a s i l y  f i n d  t he  i d e a s  of  pos-  
s i b l e  worlds used t o  handle t h e  modal concep t s ,bu t  more s u b t l e  
p o s s i b l e  w o y l d s  b l a s s i f i c a t l o a s  w a s  d i s c u s s e d ,  to the b e s t  o f  
my knowledge, only by Lakoff (1 968)  and Morgan ( 1  969). hIy c l a m  
i s  t h a t  we need a very sophisticated classification schemae 
f o r  t h e  possible worlds f e a t u r e s .  
A s e t  o f  f a c t s  t o  which I assign the same ontological s t a t u s  
I will c a l l  environment. The tern i s  borrowed from computer  
s c i ence ,  where i t  m s a n s  a l l  v a r i a b l e s  a c c e s s ~ b l e  from a given 
p rogram p o i n t  together with t h e i r  values. My use of  the  term i s  
justified by the  fact tha t  t h e  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  sys tem memory i s  
u s s u a l l y  performed by matching a pattern against an a s s o c i a t i v e  
data base ,  r e s u l t i n g  in bind ing  the free variables of t h e  p a t -  
t e r n  t o  some values found in t he  memory; a cces s  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
environments i n  t h e  s e n s e  de f ined  above nay result i n  different 
binding of the v a r i a b l e s ,  which i s  also t h e  case  7 t h  t h e  
environments understood i n  t n e  computer science uenr e  . 
Por t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  the  present  p a p e r  enviromuent!: can be 
t h o u ~ i l t  of 3; L:ubsetr of a TLlKl!Ti3li-like da t a  bsoe wi.t'n contenr; 
specified by some f i l t e r s  i n  g o o 1  s t a t c  ients.  In re i l i t : , .  such 
an implement~tion! would probably be i n e f f i c i e n t  and theref  O L ~  
i t  i.9 necessary t o  look f o r  another s o l u t ~ o n ,  :: tar tine; w i t h  t h e  
notion of co:ltext in Conniver ( Suosman, McUermot -19 7%) and 
QA4 (Rulifson e t  a1 1972) .  
The c r u c i a l  p o w t  o f  t i le  presented approach c o n ~ i o t : :  i n  nL- 
lowing q u i t e  complicated access  envirc:-merit c tx~uc tu re s  , t o  
\\ 
s t r e s s  this fact T use the  t e r n  " n u l t i p l %  environments . 
A soph i s t i ca t ed  lenguagc understanding system has to t a k e  into 
a c c o u n t  the  f a c t  t h a t  some o ther  beings a l s o  have the ability to 
use na$ural language, t o  remember even t s ,  t o  make inferences  
e t c ,  For t he  sake o f  s i m p l i c i t y  any r e a l  o r  f i c t i o u s  being 
capab le  o f  using a n a t u r a l  language will be c a l l e d  a person. 
P r a c t i c a l l y ,  persons w i l l  be e i t h e r  humans, engaged in a dis- 
course with the  system o r  humans mentioned in such a i i s cou r se ,  
b u t  we can mean by personE a l s o  another  language understanding 
systems and r o b o t s ,  pe r so f in ica t ions  of  an'imals from c h i l i r e -  
t a l e s ,  e t c .  I n  t h e  l ack  o f  arguments t o  t he  cont ra ry ,  t h e  oys- 
tern will assume t h a t  t h e  language using a b i l i t i e s  of other  
persons a r e  identical with t hose  of i t o e l f .  Therefore  it can 
e a s i l y  simulate re levant  aspect  of other persono mental 
processes by running recl l rs ivelg i t s  own language proceaa&ng 
r ou t i ne  i n  a suitable environment. For  example, i f  t h e  system 
pe rce ives  the ~ e n t e n c e  (13)  said by P r e d - t q  Stanley: 
(19 )  I l i k e  YOUT boo:i. 
if -\\ \\ I\ 
.L and you are respectively bound to Fred apd \Stanley; such 
t reatment  a l l o w s  i t  to obtain t h e  c o r r e c t  value of tile sen- 
tence, which may be represented as: 
(20) Fred likes stanley's book. 
In the t e x t :  
(21. r )  Frank said: 
(21.2) " B e n  I came back, John was already wai t lng for me 
and asked:  
( 2 1 . 3 )  'HOW a r e  
the clause 1 .  I )  may be evaluated i n  the snvirbnment of t he  
system i t s e l f .  The mention of  Frank causes the environnent of 
\\ \\ Frank to be created o r  recovered with the prounon I p r e s e t  
to Frank ; the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  or ( 21 .2) is done by the recurs ive  
c a l l  to the language processing r ou t i ne  in the environment of 
Prank. The mention of John y i e l d s  t h e  environment o f  ~ o h n , w h i c h  
i s  embedded i n  the  environment o f  Frank; t he re fo re  from the 
p o i n t  of view o f  t he  system, i t  i s  the environment of  John a s  
desc r ibed  by Frank. T h i s  pe r son  environment has t he  pronoun 
I" p re se t  a o  usua l  t o  t h e  r e spec t ive  person and t he  pronoun 
you\' i s  s e t  t o  nis cu r ren t  i n t e r l o c u t o r ,  i. e. P x M ~ ~ ,  'l'he sen- 
tence (21.3) and o ther  sentences  repor ted  by Frank as  s a i d  by 
John a r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  t h ~ s  environment. 
; ' lu l t ip le  pernon environmentu a l l o w  t h e  o y ~ t e m  t o  keep t r a c k  of 
3 i f f e rences  i n  p e r s o n ' s  knowledge, which has impor tance  for 
neny reasons.  For example, it is difficult t o  account for the 
use o f  the  i n d e f i n i t e  noun phrase  i n  (22.5) in t h e  t ex t  
( ~ h a r n i a k  1~72 :185) :  
( 2 2 .  I )  Jack and Bill were outside flying R kite. 
( 2 2 . 2 )  A s t r o n g  wind came by and the string broke. 
( 2 2 . 3 )  ~ a n e t  and   lice W ~ T C  ' ' ~ u t ~ i c i + ?  t h e  house. 
( 2 2 . 4 )  Jane t  loaked up and said: 
(22.5) Look Alice ,  t h e r e  is a k i t e  i ~?cag .  
1:-ithcut q a r a t i n g  the knowledge of the ~ a r r a t o r  and the  ad- 
d ressee  f rom the  howledge of Jane t ,  
By keeping t r a c k  o f  the  knowledge and o e l i e f s  f o r  every  persor .  
i n  t h e  d iscourse ,  we are able LO give an obvious explanation 
f o r  t h e  difference between f a c t u a l  and non-factual  sentences,  
e .  g. (Kiparsky  1971 : 345 ) :  
( 2 3 )  John r e g r e t s  t ha t  i t  i s  raining. 
(24 )  John thinks ttst it is ra ining.  
In  the first case i t  i s  the  environment of the addressee ?:rk:ich 
\i i\ i s  a f f e c t e d  o y  an eva lua t ion  of the  phrase it is r a i n i r ~ g  . 
According t o  o u r  t rea tment  of presupposi t ion ,   he v a l u e  of that 
phrase is added t o  t he  environment o f  t h o  oddreooec ,   ere 
e v e n t u a l l y  mag be collapsed wi th  ano ther  mention 31' t i le  rain 
An ana log ica l  p rocess  i s  independently performod i n  t:ie pnvi -  
Ponment of John. n t he  second case i t  i s  exclucively tile i?:-- 
vironment o f  John which is af fec t r td  by the eva lua t ion  of t h o  
I\ 't phra:;e it is r a i n i n g  , while tile addre::-ee ' 3 environmer?t 
r emainx u~ichanged . .lo has been pointed out by Ido~gan (1"\.3) 
it is not t rue  t h a t  non-factual eentencea have no p resuppo-  
sitions. It can be e a s i l y  seen i n  t h e  fo l lowing text: 
( 2 5 . 1 )  John thought t he  d o o r  i s  open. 
( 2 5 . 2 )  He thought he  should open i t  
which i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  i n  the same way as the  t e x t  
( 2 b . l )  The door was open. 
(26.2) John went to open it. 
The d i f f e r e n c e  between (25) and (26) c o n s i s t s  i n  t he  environ- 
ment t o  which the  presupposition r e f e r s :  the real w o r l d  or t h e  
mind of  John,  
It should be n o t e d  thd t  the class of non-fac tua l  sen tences  and 
phrase i s  much larger than i s  usually assumed. F o r  exemple, i n  
the text ( ~ h a r n i a k  1972:191) 
(27.1) Jack and Bill were outs ide  flying a U t e .  
(27 .2 )  A s t rong wind came by and t h e  string broke. 
( 2 7 . 3 )  Janet and Alice  were outs ide  the house. 
(27.4)  When Janet looked up she s a w  a k i t e .  
a k i t e  of (27.1) and (27.4) in r e a l i t y  r e f e r s  t o  the same ob- 
j e c t ,  but in (27.4) it io r e f e r r e d  again by means of the  indef-  
i n i t c  noun phrace  t o  mark J a n e t ' s  ignorance about  i t ,  h'e lnriy 
e a o i l y  account for it by eva lua t ing  thio noun phrase only i n  
tho  environment ol, Janet ,  
Some canes invo lv ing  non-Tactual interpretation9 of phrrine:: 
and nentenccs have been diocusacd by l o g i c i a p ;  nnd ph i l o : : o -  
phers under t h c  name of i n t c l l k i o n n l  ( o p e l l c d  cvith 't' ) o~ 
& 
rntonoional ( s p e l l e d  with ) v e r b s ,  e. g. (IvIontaguc lcjrij3) : 
( 2 8 )  John lookc f o r  a unicorn,  
intensional sentences, e. g. (Ajdukiewicz 1959 ) :  
( 2 9 )  Caesar knew that t h e  capital of t he  liepublic lies 
on t he  T i b e r ,  
* "  , or belief-sentences, 3 .  g.  ( T a l ~ t e c  I d * -  ) :  
( 3 3 )  ? ~ a  be1i.c:~: s that you an I a r e  sister::. 
A 1 1  theae cases can be e a s i l y  handled by meano of  mul t lp le  
~nvironment s . 
3Jrn~ression environments. 
h the above discussion o f  persons we have assumed t h a t  exactly 
one environment is assigned to every person. There a r e  severa l  
arguments f o r  splitting this environment i n t o  at l e a s t  three  
mvironment s ,  which I c a l l  t he  environments of  behaviour,  
p re tense  and knowledge. 
Distinguishing the pretense environment from the  knowledge one 
is necegsary to handle the cases of lying, e. g. 
( 3  I ) Fred is l y i n g  when he says he l i l ces  Stanleyc u book. 
we interprete as meaning 
('32) Fred l i k e s  Stanley's book. 
in the  Fred's pretense and as 
(33) Pred does not  like Stanley's book. 
in the ~red'o belief, 
This distinction allows us a l o o  to handle the performatives 
along the  lines o f  Lsard (1974a), i. e. the sentence 
(34) I bet you 2.5 p that it will rain tomorrorv. 
1s  taken t o  be t r u e ,  because uttering it changes the respective 
t pretense (which is equ iva lea t  t s  t ; l 2  r l ~ t ; o c  af pozl;. 01 rere;- 
ence used by Isard) and the judgement during the comparison of 
-
the value of (34) with the content of r e s p e c t i v e  person envi-  
ronment founds them compatible. 
The distinction between behaviour and pretense is more d i s -  
cutcible, as it yields subtlety not needed in m o s t  a p p l i c a t i o ~ i s ,  
It is useful to handle e. g. slips of tongue and to distinguish 
* d i f f e r e n t  aspec ts  of what is saidU ( Z i f f  1972). 
To accout f o r  such l i n g u i s t i c  f a c t s  l i k e  e. g. the accept-  
a b i l i t y  o f  
(35)  John wants t o  catch  a f i s h  and he intends t o  e a t  it. 
and the non-acceptability of 
( 3 6 )  John intends t o  ca tch  a f i s h  and he  wants t o  e a t  it. 
i t  i s  necessarg,following L a k o f f  (68:7) t o  introduce additional 
environments,namely the  environment o f  d e s i r e s  and t h e  environ- 
ment of in"cel?tiol~s,  
t\ b \  The word knowledge" i n  t h c  term knowledge environment'' is n o t  
t o  be unders tood l i t e r a l l y .  I n  f a c t  i t  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  knov~ledee 
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  oomebody on t h e  evidcnce o f  i t s  behaviour ,  n t a t e -  
menta e t c .  This j u c t i f i e s  u s i n g  t h e  term impress ion  environ- 
ment s t o  cover  a l l  t h e  environments ass igned t o  a per::on. 
Choosina an environment, 
From t h e  preceeding  paragrapn i t  fo l lows t h a t  du r ing  d i s cou r se  
analysu we have u s u a l l y  sever t i l  environments a t  hand. Xvery 
phrase  i s  t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  a t  l e a s t  one environment. Th i s  
poses  t h e  problem of choosing t h e  proper  environments f o r  
t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of a given phrase .  'Je w i l l  s e e  t ha t  t h e r e  
e x i r ~ t  s e v e r a l  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  handle the  p rob le s ,  vihich d i f f e r  
i n  the  amount of computationttl r e s o u r c e s  ( t i n e  and memory) uoed 
t h i s  fact may be considered t o  be the analogue of t h e  hunan 
a b i l i t y  t o  change the  amount of  a t t e n t i o n  devoted t o  d i s c o u r s e  
undre s t  anding. 
Let  us imagine a highly s o p h i s t i c d t e d  computer-aided i n s t r u c -  
tion system. During a t each ing  s e s s i o n  with a s tudent  t h e  sys- 
t e m  models i t s  i n t e r l o c u t o r  by means o f  a person environment, 
composed of t h e  behaviour environment (used e .  to "On!lr.? 
t h e  s t u d e n t  response t i m e ) ,  t h e  p re t ense  and t h e  knowledge 
environments, The knowledge environment i s  p rese t  t o  Gome 
general  knowledge and i t  i s  oystemat ica l ly  upda ted  by t;,e m a -  
lysi~ o f  s tudent  u t t e n a n c e ~ .  If ke do not exclude the  yes- 
s i b i l i t y  t h a t  the s tudent  l i e s ,  -e should i n t e r p r e t e  theill 
d i r e c t l y  in l l i n  knowledge environment. I n  any co-c , the  pre tense  
is use fu l  t o  s t ~ r e  t h e  result:: o f  such per forna t ivcs  3:: 
otudent':: d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  nyl:lbols e t c .  If the  s tudent  i:uotes 8 
manual o r  a l e c t u r e r ,  i t  i s  necessary t o  c r e e t c  a new person 
environment and t o  eva lua te  the  whole quoted passage i n  i t  '.Tr?en 
t h e  system i s  going t o  say  somethiiig t o  t : le s tuden t ,  i t  21:suld 
, -  - 2  J ,- - ,  v e r i f y  ~ : l i ~  t h c r  t h e  u"im;.o::z - -  A - LA - * A  - - A -  - -  A m  .-,--> +-- 1111, 
m c~tudent .  1 verification i s  made by running i t s  utterance in 
the  s t uden t ' s  environment, which allows i t  t o  compare t h e  r e a l  
i n t e n t i o n  o$ i t s  u t t e rance  with t h e  i n t e n t i o n  p r o b a b l y  assigned 
t o  i t  by s tudent .  To be more s t r i c t ,  i n  the  s tuden t ' s  environ- 
ment t he  environment of the  system as imagined by the  s tudent  
should be c rea ted ,  and the  u t t e rance  run i n  the  pretense o f  i t ;  
t he  r e s u l t s  should be compared wi th  t he  r e s u l t s  o f  running the  
u t t e r ances  i n  the  proper pre tense  of the system. 
O ~ v i o u s l y , t h i s  i s  a complicated and r e s o u r c ~  consuming process ,  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  c a r ry  on w i t h  reasonable e f f i c i ency .  1Jewertheless, 
I th ink  t h a t  processes  performed i n  the  mind of  a t a l en t ed  
teacher  working a t  full c a p a b i l i t i e s  must be similar. 
Let us now take ail example from the  o ther  extreme, when the  
system works according t o  the  r e l i a b i l i t y  rule , It may be t he  
syotem from o w  first example during a session of knowledge 
a cqu i s i t i on  when d i scuss ing  a subject  with a teacher .  Now 1% 
is q u i t e  posa ib le  t o  in t roduce a l l  the information d i r e c t l y  t o  
3 * t h e  lcnowledge environment o f  the ,;yntcm, 1; I .  L :.hc ti::ol s 
a credously a c c e p t i n g  every th ing  v~lirlt io s a i d .  It ir evidently 
quite easy b o t h  for humans and computers; i n  practice hunan.1 
apply this s t r a t e g y  mainly when they a r e  f o r c e d  t o  d e v o t e  rnor3.t- 
o f  t h e i r  computational power t o  o ther  t a s k s  of  a h igher  
p r i o r i t y .  
Between these  t w o  ext renes  there  exist many mixed strategies, 
where the system f o r  every person o f  the aiscourse makes an 
independent dec i s ion ,  whether o r  not t o  c r e a t e  a new environ- 
ment, based both on the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the p e r s o n  and the  
a v a l l a b i l i t s  o f  resources,  
r T-opic environments, 
The usual way of handling the  reference problem is t o  compute 
f o r  every noun phrase o r  pronoun a separa te  l i s t  of poss ib le  
r e f e r e n t s  afid t o  use some h e u r i s t i c s  to choose one element f r o m  
the l i s t .  Another  approach,  advocated here, cons i s t s  i n  s t o r i n g  
all p o s s i b l e  referents permanently available into a s p e c i a l  
t o p i c  environments. The i tems s to red  i n  the t op i c  environments 
may be the symbols of  physical  o b j e c t  a s  we21 as some r e l a t i o n s  
and other semantic data s t r u c t u r e s ,  put  t h e r e  during the  eval- 
uation o f  r e s p e c t i v e , l i n g u i o t i c  cons t ruc t s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  thr 
i n d e f i - n i t e  d t t s c r i p t i o i 1 ~  of t h e  t y p e  ( 3 e l l c r t  197':: 3 2 )  
( 3 7 )  It i s  a f o r e i g n e r  who i s  d e l i v e r i n g  espeech now. 
(38)  One young boy has f lunked  h i s  m t r i c u l e t i o n  exem, 
a r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  as  d e c l a r a t i o n s ,  used t o  c r e a t e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
d a t a  s t r u c t u r e 3  t o  be put i n t o  t h e  t o p i c ;  t h e r e f o r e  do r.ct 
need t h e  Ref o p e r a t o r  o f  B e l l c r t  (1372:3 ) i n t r o d u c e d  t o  k s n d l r  
such examples. 
I n  every t o p i c  environment t h e  i t e m s  a r e  r d e r e d  i n  ooxe way; 
t he  access  rou t ine  1 cn r e  q u e s t  t h e  mbseqirent  elements 
u f  t h e  t o p i c  i n  the  very o r d e r ;  i f  t he  environment i s  exhausted 
and some new candida te  for a r e f e r e n t  i s  nee6ed, t a e  a c  e m  
rout ine  switches t o  t he  r e s p e c t i v e  super-envirorment. 
hkery succesful access  t o  the  t o p i c  cauees it-s p e ~ m u t a t i o n , ~ v h i c h  
r e s u l t s  5-11 making t h e  a c c e s s e d  i t e m  thc  f irst  e lement  of  tile 
environment. 
The e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  bet~~*ec:: the t r a d i t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  and 
t h a t  presented  he17e lies i n  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o "   st^. c t ~ r i n e ,  a
t o p i c  enviror~?.ent.  
F o r  example (~sard 1974a),  i n  t h e  t e x t :  
( ~ 9 . 1 )  ;'!hat did John s a y  about; Dick? 
(39 .2)  He said t h a t  
( 39 .3 )  h e  l o o k e d  like a druaken g i r a f f e  cn i b e  ska t e s .  
t h e r e  i s  c o  doubt  that hhe" o f  i.39 ' 3 )  r e f e r s  t o  Dick.-ile account 
ioz* i t  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  way: every first use of a v e r o  of  t h e  
'\verbLm diccndi ' '  f-yp.l,e c3uaea a 1 t o p i c  environment to b e  
c r ea t ed ;  tile environment i s  n t a l i ,  in our case t o  Dick 
and t l l e ~ ~  i t c e l f  bec~mes an item of the c u r r e n t  t o p i c .  T r ~ e  nex t  
mention of t h a t  a c t  o f  communicatio~ cQU:ie:; t he  s e ~ r c h  in tire 
c u r r e n t  t o p i 0  for the environment previously stored ; vhen it i c  
found, t h e  reported c l a u s e  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  within it. Tn our 
ceoe the first word oi: t h e  reported c l ause  is -\;he pronoun "he\' 
which c a l l s  t h e  acce s s  r o u t i n e  f o r  a posoiblc r e f e r e n t .  4s tho  
first and on ly  possible r e l e r e n t  o f  the current toplc is 1 ) i . c ~  
the pronoun is p r o p e r l y  bound. 
In the caze of  t h e  t e x t  
(40.1 ) '#Rat bid John sag about nicp? 
(40.2) iie s a l d  that 
(40.3) t e  doubted whethlr irick would l i k e  it. 
tile pronoun w i l l  be a l so  a t  first bound t o  Dick  f r o m  t h e  t o p i c  
\\ But when t h e  p r o p e r  name ~ i c k "  w i l l  be evaluated ,  an a t t e m p t  
will be made to s h i f t  i l i ck  t o  the  f i r s t  p o s i t i o u  in t h e  t o p i c  
where it a l r eady  i s  located.  This is a v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  e l f i ~  
ciency r d e ,  and this interpretation will e r e j e c t e d .  Rext 
possible refrent will then be obtaln from the super-environment 
yielding the correct result. 
There are some exceptions t o  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  r u l e ;  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
redundancy is d e s i r a b l e  immediately after topic switching: 
( 4  1 .1 )  Ylhat d i d  John say  about Dick? 
( 4  t . r )  He naid t ha t  
(41l.3) Dick Tooked like b drunken g i r d ~ f c  or. i ~ e  l:ates. 
Another al-gur~ellt for t o p i c  : t:*uctullint; is ti:c exist P:.~c iYT xi': 
(42) Jnnet, M.11 and 1 sis t ex1 tir.lc:l :.:ere cut  ::l<e, 
it Jane t  Baid: 1' c a l i b t  keep t h i s  kitten. 'Jould you l i k e  t o  
'I\ \ \  \ \  \ .,* hdve i t r  l iclen? . Yes , m i d  Helen. R i l l  s a i d  A d o n ' t  
/<now, Remembpr ! t ~k J c c  t e d  t o  tphn t r o b i n .  >he 
" \\ 
would no t  i c t  us keep it . But L.other & a i d  it is cct 
\' \ i good t o  keep s r o b i n  indoors, s a ~ d  flelen,  It is ~ o t  
I \  \ \ \ \ fair t o  t h e  robin , Look,  s a l d  Janet, D, you want i t  
o r  not ?\'. 
At this stage the topic p r o b l e m  i s  t h e  l e a s t  e l a b o r a t e d  p a r t  o f  
my m u l t i p l e  e w i r o n m e n t s  approach ; the re fo re  I am not a ~ l e  t o  go 
i n t o  d e b a i l s  he re ,  Fome a d d i t i o n a l  argument in f a v o u r  o f  the  
t o p i c  environment i d e a s  w i l l  be fcund in the paragraph 4.2. 
4, Runninrg an utterance . 
By desimators I understand the l i n g u i s t i c  means used t o  r e f e r  
t o  particular objects. Designators  may be c l a s s i f i e d  roughly 
into three classes:  proper names; common names and description9. 
A l l  t h r ee  kinds o f  designators have been discussed f o r  c e n t u r i e s  
by p h i l o s o p h e r s  and l o g i c i a n s ;  o u r  pragmatic app roaah  t o  t h e  
designators i s  based mainly on  t h e  works of  ICripke (1 972) and 
Donnellan (1971). 
The characteristic festure of p r o p e r  names i s  t h a t  their use 
must be preceded by the a c t  o f  fixing thdreference. Contrary 
t o  popular o p i n i o n ,  i n  practice proper  names w e  much more 
ambiguous than common names , because pr ORT names re f er to 
individuals and common namels t o  classes of  individual^, For 
example, there are many men ca l l ed  John and i f  w e a r e  
t o  understand e.  g. 
(43) John has come. 
we need t o  have the  referent of  John a l ready f ixed .  Different 
types  of ob jec t  have p roper  names of d i f f e r e n t  stability. 
Countries, towns, mountains e t  c. have of  ten unique names which 
are  r a r e l y  changed.Most human f u l l  names a r e  also r a t h e r  stable 
from the p r a c t i c a l  p o i a t  o f  view.Forenames a r e  s o  ambiguous tha t  
t h e i r  r e f e r e n t s  have t o  be r e s e t  again and again in every dis- 
course, e.g. by quoting the  f u l l  hame o f  the  person in question. 
Such p r o p e r  names as  first and second pereon pronouns may 
alternate their meaning even dur ing one discourse. To sumarize, 
proper names in fact name some recognition routine supplied i n  
the a c t  of f ix ing  the reference. 
Common names do not r e f e r  d i r e c t l y  t o  individuals, but  they a r e  
names of characteristic functions o f  the respec t ive  sets of 
individua1s;their mealling is s o  s t a b l e  t h a t  they can be assumed 
to belong t o  the knowledge of t h e  world; and therefore ,  fixing 
the  reference, except i n  some peculiar cases, need not be 
performed. 
D e s c r i p t i o n s  a r e  compound names cons t ruc ted  nd iloc by npcc i a l  
l i n g u i n t i c  means, l i k e  qualifyirlg 3 common noun by an ad j c c t i v e  
e t c .  They name 3 1 n o  r e s p e c t i v e  compound c h n m c t c r i ~ t l c  
f u n c t i o n s ,  
A l l  t h e  desic;n;nators are usually used i n  t n e  referential way. 
That means t h a t  tile r e s p c t i v e  procedure i s  cvnlunttJ in a 
proper environment to yield the in tended  r e f e r e n t .  Such t r e o t -  
meat agrees  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  with Donnellan's i n t u i t i o n  that a 
d e f i n i t e  description does n o t  in i t s e l f  refer t o  anything but 
only  its use p o i n t s  t o  a r e f e r e n t .  Therefore ,  c.e nay exp la in  
e a s i l y  why t h e  sentence  ( ~ o n n e l l t l n  1 9 7 1 : l l O ) :  
(44) Her husband is kind to he r .  
can be sometimes properly unders tood even if t he  man refered to 
is not t h e  husband of t h e  woman; such a sentence is j u s t  t o  be  
eva lua ted  i n  the  environment o f  f a l s e  b e l i e  of t h e  sender .  
Qui te  o f t en  t h e  sender uses undersp 'eci f ied d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  i. e. 
t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  which r e f e r  t o  a much larger set of i n d i v i d -  
u d l s  than i t  i s  in t ended ,  e. g. i n  Gnarniak ( 1972:72) : 
(45.1) Mother m a d e  some cookies and l e f t  one on a p l a t e .  
(45.2) She p u t  the  p l a t e  on the k i t c h e n  t a b l e  and went .  i n t o  
living room. 
" the  p l a ~ e ' '  of (45.2) by i t s e l f  refers t o  every  p l a t e  of the 
world. 
The addressee  has i n  such s i t u a t i o n s  to r e s t r i c t  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  
characteristic function to the o b j e c t  on his c u r r e n t  t o p i c ;  
if i t  does n o t  s u f f i c e ,  h e  need t o  e l iminat8 the remaining 
ambigui t ies  i n  the usual way, i. e. by meano of  t h e  coherency, 
cons i s t ency  and e f f i c i e n c y  ru l e s .  
A l l  des igna tors  e x c e p t  pronouns can a l s o  be use tn an a t t r i b u t -  
i v e  way. I n  t h i s  case 
-
t hey  mean just their characterintic 
func t ions .  For example 
(46 )  hiount Evers t  i s  Chomolungna. 
means that i n  the sender 'a  beliefs the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  
of fv'lowlt Everest has  a s  w e l l  all re levan t  s e a t u r e s  of Chomol- 
ungma. In  some other usage the respective characteristic 
f u n c t i o n  i s  to be adapted by the addreL,;ac t o  h e  J L L : * - X  11-5 
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(47) Ile i s  a l i t t l e  Napoleon. 
More common i s  attributive use of common names and d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  
b 
d. g. 
(48) The smith's murdered is insane. 
in the  sense o f  
(49)  Whoever has murdered Smith, he i s  insane. 
A t t r i b u t i v e  use of i n d e f i n i t e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  i s  a1 s o  known as 
L\ 
nonspec i f i c  s e t t i n g  , e. g. (Charniak 1972:178) a k i t t e n "  
i n  (50. 1: 
( 5 0 .  I )  Jack wanted a k i t t e n .  
( 5 0 . 2 )  Bill had a k i t t e n  and Jack o f f e r e d  t o  t r a d e  his b a l l  
f o r  the k i t t en .  
( 5 0 . 3 )  Bill wanted t o  keep  his k i t t e n ,  so Jack went t o  l o o k  
f o r  George who a l s o  had a k i t t e n .  
(50 .4 )  George was w i l l i n g  t o  t r a d e  s o  Jack g o t  his k i t t e n .  
It is i n t e r e a t i n g  that t h e  SI1RDLU program ( Y / i i n o g r a d ~ l ~ 7  2 )  
t r e a t  i n d e f i n i t e  descr ip t ions ,which a r e  used on ly  a t  t x ~ i b u t i v e l ~ ,  
'3. g*  
( 5 1 )  piclc up a big block 
( 5 2 )  f i nd  a b l o c k  which is t a l l e r  than t h e  one you a r e  
holding and put i t  i n t o  the box 
jus t  along the  lines given above, i. e. as programs with a f r e e  
var iab le  (Xinograd 1972 : 1 30 1 , a1 though Pinograd himself de- 
scribes it, probab ly  influenced by t h e  l o g i c a l  tradition, by 
means o f  t he  v a r i a b l e  bound by the  e x i s t e n t i a l  n u a n t i f ~ e r  
(1972: 1 2 6 ) .  
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a t u r e  of  p r o p e r  and cormon nouns l o  t h e t  
they  ore  always t o  be run i n  a single environment. It i s  not 
the  case with desc r ip t ions  which mag r equ i re  suitable ~ p l i t -  
t i n g  between s e v e r a l  environments. It has been noted by 
Winograd (1972: 147) with r e s p c t  t o  the  t i ne  re fe rence ,  e. g. : 
(53)  Idany r i c h  men made their fo r tunes  during the  d e p r e s s i o n ,  
(54)  Idany rich men l o s t  t h e i r  f o r t u n e s  during the  depression,  
( 5 5 )  Many rich men worked i n  restaurants during the d e p r e s -  
s ion ,  
\ I n  these  sentences the  rich men" phrase i s  t o  be evaluated i n  
the  p r e s e n t  time environment f o r  ( 53 ) ,  i n  the  p a s t  t i n e  envi- 
ronment f o r  (54), and the  sentence ( 5 5 )  is ambiguou:: when 
taken out of a larger context. 
There are other ainilar case:q, e, g.  t h e  acctendc 
(56) Smith  Knows t h d t  t h e  f r i e n d  of i ~ o w a l - h i c  s brother i:: 
is s u b j e c t  t o  several interpretation:;; acme of then art3 
( 5 7 )  Smith kncwu Kov~al  s k i ,  ICowaZcki s b x * o t L - : c ~  r'In i , i ~  
.Criend of ~owalski's brother and Llnimlth lanows that the 
friend of I(owa1ski ' s brother is a vrrite13. 
( 5 0 )  Smith does not know Kowalski, but he knows ~ o w a l n k i ' s  
brother and the friend of icowalski's b r o t h e l .  md  Smith 
knows that the friend of ~owalski's brother is a ivriter. 
Obviously, ' the interpretations (57) and  (58) differ in the way 
\\ 
t h e  p h r a s e  "the friend of Powalskf's brother is split be tween 
the environments of the knowledge of t he  sender and the ih?ow- 
ledge of Smith. 
Mnce we allow designators to switA env i ronm~nts ,  we have no 
problem with so called nouns vvi tll erlpty denotdtion ; they are 
to be evaluated in the respective fictitious w o r l d s ,  e. g. 
(59 )  I met h i m  in t h e  p a r k  by the sculp tur t .  of a faun. 
4 f 2 .  Pointers. 
In this paragraph we shall d i z c u s s  the reference problem for 
the third person pronouns,the most important class of pomters. 
\\ We shall f'ormulatc a r u l e  intendcd to  s u b s t i t ~ t e  t h e  connand 
\ \  
rule xi' t h e  tmnsf ox?i!ational grammar. The arguaento in J avour 
o f  our r u l e  a r e  oinplicity, b c t t t ~ ~  o d e q u ~ c y  and ufiage of t21c 
demo11 f a c i l i t y  whicn should be p r e r e n t  in the  sgstel:: f o r  o the r  
reanons ( ~ h a r n i a k  1972).  
First, we a h a l l  remind t ha t  eve ry  accesr  t o  t h e  t c p i c  pe-nutc:: 
i t  by advnnc icg  the  ac3crseed element t o  the  ve ry  beg inn in^; 
o f  t he  t o p i c ;  succesful evt l luat ion of  e des igna to r  introducing 
~1 new aob jec t  p u t s  the  r c p r e : : e n t ~ t L ~ : :  3f t he  obj e c t  also a t  
t h e  very beginning of the  t o p i c .  Our r u l e  s t d t e s  t h a t  the main 
L c lause  pronouns imrnediat e l y  execute access  .o the  ! o ; L c ,  
while  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  subordinate clause  pronouns rcay be 
suspnded if t l l e r e  io l ~ c  s u i t a b l e  value for them l n  t h e  
I ?  t o p i c ;  a l l  t he  pronouns s'noYbxld be resolved be t.Tbr ri:t. i l ! c  c ~ f  
t h e  main clause  processing.  
Let  us see  h o w  the r u l e  works f o r  examples  from (:.lcCawiey 
1 ~ / 1 : 2 2 6 ) .  
(60) 4 f t e r  John l e f t  h i s  apar tment ,  he w e ~ t  o  t h e  p o o l  hall. 
The p r o p e r  name " ~ o h n "  advances the J'orm's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a t  
\ \  
the b e g i n n i ~ g  o f  t h e  t op i c .  The pronoun his" i s  evaluated 
because t h e r e  i s  a t  l e a s t  one s u i t a b l e  va lue  in Xie t o p i c ,  
i . e .  John ; if bounding of\'his" t o  John  i s  r e j e c t e d  by some 
r \  \\ pragmatic  r u l e ,  another  p o s s i b l e  r e f e r e n t  i s  found, ne i s  
s e t  t o  i t  and t h e  r e f e r e n t  i s  advanced a t  the beginning 
of the  t @ p i c ,  g e t t i n g  ahead o f  John , Vhen "her i s  eva lua ted ,  
'\ it is u s ~ e l l y  bound t o  t h e  same r e f e r e n t  as his", which may 
be John o r  some o t h e r  person. 
( b l )  After  he l e f t  his apartment, John went t o  the pool 
hall, 
" ~ f t e r "  i n t roduces  a subordina te  clause,  whii.h may be auo- 
\ \  pended if t h e r e  i z  no q u i t a b l c  value f o r  '\he\' o r  "i7is i n  
the t o p i c ;  i f  t h e  clause i o  suspended, i t  can be r o o m e d  :.dlen 
\\ \ \  
eva lua t ion  o f  J o h ~  pu t s  i t s  valuc t o  t h e  t o p i c .  
(62) Joha -:ient t o  t h e  p o o l  room u f  t e r  he l e f t  :.;is cpar tnent .  
\\ \ \  
There i s  no problem with t h e  sentence ; John s e t s  t h e  t o p i c  
\i 
supply ing  a pos s ib l e  value for "he\\ and his". 
( 6 3 )  He went t o  t he  p o o l  h a l l  a f t e r  John l e f t  his apartment. 
The "he" i s  evalua ted  immediately; t h e r e f o r e  t h e  eva lua t ion  of 
" ~ o h n "  cannot i n f l u e a c e  its value.  The s t rong  f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e  
va lue  o f  "he" should be d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  John i s  explained as 
t he  v i o l a t i o n  o f  the  e f f i c i e n c y  r u l e :  i f  you can r e f e r  t o  an 
ob j ec t  by a p o i n t e r  and t h e r e  is no p o s s i b i l i t y  of misunder- 
s tqnd ing ,  do  n o t  r e f e r  t o  i t  by a des ignator .  
( 6 4 )  A boy who saw her k i s s e d  a g i r l  who knew him. 
I am anxious t o  see  a sentence of  this type i n  an a u t h e n t i c  
Engl ish t e x t ,  n o t  as  an example of a re fe rence  problem, because 
I do no t  see any circumstances under which such a sentence 
can be uttered. Bone the  l e s s ,  we can handle thehexample e a s i l y .  
F i r s t ,  a boy" i s  evaluated, y i e l d i n g  a p e r  son environment v~hich 
I L i s  p u t  i n t o  t he  top ic .  Next, who saw h e r "  i s  evalua ted  except 
f o r  the  \her\' because of t h e  l a c k  o f  a s u i t a b l e  va lue  for ;t I n  
t he  top ic  ; there fore  , the clause is xuopendod, '!!hen t h e  r e s t  
of the  main clause 1s evaluated and t h e  pe raon  e n v i r o n m ~ n t  for 
\\ 
H i s  c r e a t e d ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  an updat ing  o f  t h e  t o p i c .  
Now t h e  suspended  clause can be reoumed and evaluated i n  p a r a l -  
\\ lel with  ti12 c lause  who knew hid' ; a l l  the pronoun:: will be 
p r o p e r l y  bound. 
Althougll i t  should be obvious ,  i t  is b e t t e r  t o  s t a t e  e x p l i c i t g  
t h a t  t h e  va lue  o f  his in ( 6 0 ) - ( s 3 )  is f i n a l l y  f i x e d  by t i l e  
coherency rule. 
Analogically as with subordinate c lauses ,  we can treat paren- 
t h e t h i c a l  c l auses  and phrases ,  e. g. :  
(b5)  In  ~ o h n ' s  apartment,  he smskes p o t .  
( 6 6 )  I n  his apartment, John smolces p o t ,  
and ob ta in  t h e  desired results, 
It i s  hoped that the above discussion together  with works  of  
I sa rd ,  Davies and Longuet-Higgins has shown the  advantage of 
t r eak ing  discourses  and u t t e rances  as programs. Below we g ive  
an a d d i t i o n a l  argument i n  favour of this approach,  based on an 
article by Karttunen (1974) .  He presented d i f f i c u l t i e s  r e l a t e d  
t o  finding the  presupposi t ion for a compound sentence and 
suggested they  b'e avoided by adopting t h e  more dynamic approach 
o f  a r e c u r s i v e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  satisfaction o f  presupposi- 
t ion" condi t ion .  This i d e a  can be e a ~ i l y  i n t e g r n t e d  i n  our 
model,  as i t  i s  t e s t  i l l u a t r a t c d  from examples 
(67 )  If Dean t o l d  the  tru-tih, Nixon i a  guilty t o o .  
(bR) if Haldeman i s  guilty, Nixon is g u i l t y  t o o .  
(69) If Miss Woods d e s t r o y e d  the  missing t a p e s ,  Nixon is 
g u i l t y  t o o .  
The consequent clause in 911 o f  these prenupposca t he  g u i l t  of 
someone e l s e ,  but the  presupposition of  the irholc sentences 
J".? 
- ? ;  1 - ; , , $1,1,)- differ: (b8)  d e f i n i t e l y  do-:: no t  prc;;~1i);)3. .  . I L  c , L L L -  
olio i- Ise vfki la  (67) and (69) may presuppose  it or n o t ,  depending 
upon the c i rcumstances  of  t h e i r  use. In our model the  antecedent 
clauses a r e  run before  the  consequent c lause ;  t h e r e f o r e  i n  (68 )  
the  presupposition of the consequent clause i s  satisfied by the  
antecedent  and i n  (6 '1 )  and (b9)  i t  can a l s o  be the  case, de- 
pending upon the other knowledge ava i l ab le .  in the environment 
of the eva lua t ion .  
, Conclusions. 
&en if some of the presented ideas may becoae obso le te  throught 
f u r t h e r  research,  the usefulnew of t h e  s o p h ~  s * ~ a t e d  environment 
B trmctures f o r  na tu ra l  language d e s c r i p t i o n s  se ems evident. The 
notion of environment deserves a p l a c e  as a c r u c i a l  not ion i n  
a f u l l y  adequate theory of na tu r a l  language. It i s  important 
that  t h e  environment structures p o s t u l a t e d  here involve qu i t e  
complicated embedding o f  environments without any static 
restrictions on the depth o f  t h e  embedding. A t  the  preoent 
s t a t e  o f  art, i t  is convenient to deocr ibe  such s t r u c t 6 r e o  i n  
. . t e rms  o f  computer s c i e n c e ,  because e .  g, t 'o1~1e.l  1ot;i.c LA i . ~  - r k  
only u 1 -~213. ': 1~1,s bc t neen  di fi 'erent p o ~ c i b l r  c o s l d s  . 
This f a c t ,  t o g e t h e r  with some o t h e r  advantages shorvn i n  t h e  
papey, makes a strong argument in favour  of  t r e a t i n g  d i s c o u r s e s  
and ut t erances as pr ograrns . 
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